Abstract-Soft errors caused by transient bit flips have the potential to significantly impact an application's behavior. This has motivated the design of an array of techniques to detect, isolate, and correct soft errors using microarchitectural, architectural, compilation-based, or application-level techniques to minimize their impact on the executing application. The first step toward the design of good error detection/correction techniques involves an understanding of an application's vulnerability to soft errors. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive characterization of the impact of soft errors on the convergence characteristics of six iterative methods using application-level fault injection. In particular, we consider the use of iterative methods to incrementally solve a linear system of equations, which constitute the core kernel in many scientific applications. We analyze the impact of soft errors in terms of the type of error (single-vs multi-bit), the distribution and location of bits affected, the data structure and statement impacted, and variation with time. In addition to understanding the vulnerability of iterative solvers to soft errors, this characterization can aid the design of fault injection campaigns that ensure systematic coverage.
I. INTRODUCTION
When a transient bit flip affects a hardware component, the application is said to be impacted by a soft error. When a soft error escapes hardware detection and impacts the application state, it can impact execution by leading to incorrect results or significantly impacting application execution times. Recent architectural trends, such as near-threshold voltage operation and constrained power budgets, exacerbate the frequency and impact of soft errors.
A broad array of techniques has been designed to understand application behavior under soft errors and to detect, isolate, and correct soft-error-impacted application state. The first step toward tolerating soft errors involves understanding an application's behavior under soft errors. This can help elucidate the need for error detection/correction techniques. An ideal error detection/correction strategy identifies all and only the errors that can materially impact application behavior. Detecting and recovering from errors that may eventually be masked by the application can unnecessarily increase the cost of soft error resilience. Different portions of the application state may be impacted differently by a soft error, enabling optimizations and data-structure-specific resilience techniques. Finally, evaluating the effectiveness of such techniques requires a systematic assessment of their overall performance in protecting various portions of the application state throughout the execution.
In this paper, we systematically characterize the behavior of six iterative methods-CG, ILU-preconditioned CG, BiCG, CGS, BiCGSTAB, and QMR-in the presence of soft errors. These methods are exemplar of an important class of methods used to solve systems of equations and constitute the core kernel in many large-scale scientific applications. These methods employ closely related approaches for solving a system of linear equations, enabling us to understand the impact of seemingly small, albeit significant, algorithmic changes on soft error behavior.
We perform the analysis on the SuiteSparse Matrix Collection (formerly known as the University of Florida Sparse Matrix Collection), and find 28 data sets that satisfy the requirements for the six methods considered. These data sets are derived from real-world scenarios, enabling evaluation using realistic workloads. While these methods are often used in large-scale calculations, comprehensive characterization using such executions can be prohibitively expensive. The matrices considered are small enough to permit inexpensive sequential execution, allowing us to perform multiple runs.
We employ a deterministic error injection strategy to systematically explore the space of possible error behaviors. We consider 1, 2, and 4 bit error injections under uniform and beta distribution of the bit positions affected by the error. We consider all statements and vectors in the iterative methods as candidates for error injection. To reduce fault injection overheads, we identify and prune error injections that will lead to masked errors and those that will lead to the same outcomes as other error injection configurations. In sum, we performed a total of 1,744,800 error injection runs and collected more than 2.5TB data 1 .
To understand the soft error behavior of an application during execution, we estimate the application's runtime behavior from the pruned set of fault injection experiments. We analyze the data to identify differences in soft-error-induced behavior stemming from the choice of data sets, choice of position and number of bits affected, the statement and vector affected, and the point in an execution time when an error is injected.
We observe that a large fraction (> 50%) of soft errors are masked by the evaluated iterative methods, quantitatively demonstrating that iterative methods are naturally resilient to soft errors. Also, we find that soft errors can lead to faster convergence, which provides potential optimization opportunities. Our analysis show that the solvers behave starkly different from each other. For example, for CGS, unlike other solvers, a significant fraction of exponent and sign errors lead to faster execution. Finally, we observe that the impact of soft errors on individual vectors differs considerably.
II. SOLVERS AND DATA SETS
We consider iterative methods to solve a system of linear equations A · − → x = − → b , where A is a sparse matrix, and − → b and − → x are vectors. At each iteration, the methods compute an approximate value of − → x . Execution completes when the to be a symmetric positive-definite matrix and differ primarily in the preconditioner used. BiCG generalizes CG and can handle non-symmetric and non-definite systems. BiCGSTAB is more numerically stable than BiCG but computationally more expensive. CGS is more stable but less expensive than BiCG. QMR is slightly more expensive than BiCG with a smoother convergence behavior. While these methods belong to the class of non-stationary iterative methods, each one differs from the others in small yet notable ways. These methods were chosen to investigate the impact of selected differences in a group of related algorithms. Identical behavior under error would indicate that studying one of these solvers is representative of others. If not, any study involving error behavior of iterative methods must consider multiple iterative methods.
For this characterization, we use the implementation of these methods in the Iterative Methods Library (IML++) v1.2a [2] . In this library, the implementation of the methods is done using high-level API similar to the algorithmic descriptions of the iterative methods.
The methods are evaluated using the matrices in the SuiteSparse matrix collection [3] . To enable comparative evaluation, we select symmetric positive-definite matrices from the collection, which can be evaluated on all methods considered. Of these 31 matrices, three converged quickly (<10 iterations). Therefore, we focus on the remaining 28 matrices in this paper. Table I shows the list of the datasets used in this study. As shown in Table I , the number of iterations performed by a solver varies from one dataset to another one. The matrices in the library are used to initialize A in equation
is a vector of all ones, as has been done in other efforts [4] . We execute the iterative methods until the residual norm is less than 10 −6 . As execution progresses, the residual norm does not always strictly decrease. Soft errors may also lead to non-monotonic changes in the residual norms, making it difficult to discriminate error-induced behavior from normal behavior. This makes it challenging to differentiate an iterative method's execution in the presence and absence of soft errors. 
III. CHARACTERIZATION METHODOLOGY

A. Error Injection Model
To study the behavior of iterative methods in the presence of soft errors, we inject errors during the execution of these methods. In particular, we study the impact of one error (single-or multi-bit) on the execution of iterative methods. Error injection can be performed at various abstraction levels, from circuit to application level. Error injection at the circuitlevel is considered the most accurate method, but it requires sophisticated infrastructures, such as radiation exposure to processor chips [5] , [6] or processor register-transfer level (RTL) simulations [7] , [8] . Architecture-level simulators [9] , [10] also have been used to study the impact of soft errors on applications. However, these approaches have some limitations in terms of size and scale of the applications being analyzed. Software-based injection techniques can perform error injection at the application level in an accelerated fashion. PinFI [11] and BIFIT [12] are dynamic binary instrumentation-based injectors, wherein an error is randomly injected into data structures of an application. Other tools, such as LLFI [11] and KULFI [13] , are compiler-level injectors, which inject errors at the register level. The aforementioned tools come with pros and cons. For example, binary instrumentation based tools enable userdefined temporal and spatial injection, but they can introduce considerable overhead that limits the number of error injection experiments that can be performed. On the other hand, compilerbased tools significantly reduce the injection overhead but do not allow the user to precisely explore the temporal aspect of injection. The lack of temporal aspect makes it difficult to study and understand the correlation between the outcome and the location of the injected errors.
Given these limitations, we focus on a controlled applicationspecific error injection methodology by instrumenting the source code. The main property of our injection methodology is to provide simple exploration of the temporal (when the error is injected) and spatial (in which data structures the error is injected) aspects of the error injection space. Exploring the entire error injection space is time consuming but does not necessarily provide additional knowledge. For example, injecting an error in a dead vector will result in the error being masked and correct results, which we can assess without actually performing the experiment. Instead, we opt for a methodology where we perform the minimum set of experiments that still covers a meaningful part of error injection space.
B. Error Injection Sites
In iterative methods, the primary data structures involve two-dimensional matrices, multiple vectors, and scalars. The matrix representing the system of equations remains read-only throughout the execution. Read-only data structures can be protected efficiently by employing simple copy-and-compare or checksum techniques [14] , [15] . Scalars represent a relatively small fraction of the overall application state and are least likely to be affected by a soft error. Therefore, we focus on the vectors used in iterative methods, which are modified at every iteration.
In an exhaustive error injection strategy, a random element of every vector can be considered as a candidate for error injection before every statement. The implementation of the algorithm is similar to the one in Figure 1 with one function call (or operator-overloaded) statement per algorithm operation. We only consider statements that involve vectors. All iterative methods considered involve a conditional statement to initialize a subset of vectors in the first iteration. In these statements, both branches access the same vectors. Therefore, from the perspective of our error injection strategy, we can treat both branches as part of the same statement. The eight statements in the CG algorithm considered for error injection are numbered in Figure 1 . Note that both branches of the conditional statement are labeled with line number 2.
While every vector needs to be considered for error injection before each statement to ensure coverage, many of the cases lead to identical outcomes. We consider two pruning steps to identify and eliminate these redundant error injection experiments. First, an error injected into a vector will always be masked if that vector is overwritten before its next use. In terms of data-flow analysis, such a vector is not considered "live." When computing the overall impact of an error, errors at these positions can be noted as masked.
Second, consider the injection of error into vector r at statements 2-5 in Figure 1 . These statements neither define nor use r. All of these injections result in the same outcome: impact on statement 6 as if the error was injected just before statement 6. Therefore, the error injection experiments conducted for vector r just before statement 6 can be reused to characterize the impact of an error on vector r in statements 2-5.
We classify each statement-vector pair in the program according to the following rules:
• If the value in vector v will have no further uses during or after execution of statement s, but will be overwritten with a new value, (s, v) will be classified into the Dead set. In Figure 1 , (0,q), (1,q), (2,q), and (3,q) belong to this set because q will be overwritten in statement 3 before subsequent uses.
• If the value in vector v is used in executing statement s, (s, v) is placed in the used set, Used. (2,z) and (5,x) are examples of pairs in the injection set.
, it is classified as being Alive. Table III shows the classification of statement-vector pairs for the CG algorithm ( Figure 1 ). Table II reports the effects of the pruning steps in reducing the number of statement-vector pairs to be considered for error injection. For example, with CG, the two pruning steps reduce this candidate set from 40 to 13 injection points.
1) Reconstructing the error behavior under full coverage: Given a classification of statement-vector pairs into Dead, Used, and Alive sets, we perform error injection experiments only on the members of the Used set. Given the outcomes of these error injection experiments, we must compute the distribution of outcomes, i.e., percentages of all possible outcome classes considered, as if we had considered all of the candidates. Given a function Dist(s, v) that returns the distribution of outcomes from error injections on a vector v
2. Used sets for the CG method described in Figure 1. before statement s, the overall error behavior can be computed as:
where |s|, |v|, and |F I| denote the number of statements, vectors, and error injections per statement-vector pairs in the program, respectively. The distribution of outcomes Dist(s, v) is determined as:
is obtained from the errorinjection experiments for the statement pair.
we find the statement s that follows s such that (s , v) ∈ Used and return Dist(s , v).
Reproducing the error-induced behavior requires us to account for the differences in the execution times of individual statements. For example, a highly resilient and computationally expensive statement can make an algorithm more resilient, while multiple vulnerable yet inexpensive statements may have negligible impact. The execution times of individual statements will depend on the actual execution times on a given platform. To avoid tying our analysis to a specific architecture and software stack, we associate each statement with an abstract cost metric. The statements in iterative methods can be classified into three groups: (a) scalar operations, (b) vector-scalar and vector-vector operations, and (c) matrix-vector product and preconditioners. We assume scalar operations incur zero cost. Vector-vector and vector-scalar operations incur costs proportional to the length of the vectors N (all vectors in a given execution of an iterative method are of the same size). The cost of a matrix-vector product can be approximated by N 2 · nnz, where N is the matrix dimension size and nnz is the fraction of nonzeroes in the sparse matrix (nnz = (#nonzeroes)/N 2 ). Estimating the cost of a preconditioner step is challenging as it can involve an arbitrary number of operations. We approximate it with the cost of a matrix-vector multiplication (N 2 · nnz). Introducing these statement weights (w s ) gives the weighted distribution of outcomes as:
We will use this weighted distribution of outcomes as the primary metric for analyzing the error injection outcomes.
2) Error injection implementation:
Our error injection framework determines when and where to inject an error based on the following inputs: (1) iteration number, (2) statement number, (3) vector name, (4) position in the vector, and (5) list of bit positions to flip in the 64-bit vector element. Since we assume no previous knowledge about what iteration or position in vector are more vulnerable to silent data corruptions (SDCs), we randomly determine both the iteration number and vector position in which to inject an error. We use two independent random sequences and consider two distinct error models: single-and multi-bit errors. Single-bit flip errors result from alpha particle strikes that induce a transition in a bit. While memory structures such as DRAM and caches can be protected by ECC mechanisms such as SECDED or Chipkill, memory structures in legacy GPUs and FPGAs are not protected by ECC. Even when ECC is available, it can be turned off for performance and energy savings [16] . Processor datapath structures are not commonly protected by ECC, and a single bit flip in the datapath may manifest itself as a single or multiple bit flip in application state [17] . Moreover, multiple bit flips have been observed in low-power DRAMs [18] and caches operating at close to threshold voltage [19] . Singlebit flip errors enable systematic exploration of the space of possible errors. While single-bit flips are generally easier to detect (e.g., through parity code), those that escape hardware detection and generate an SDC are generally more difficult to detect by software detectors because they introduce a smaller perturbation compared to multi-bit flips. The latter are more difficult to detect in hardware but generally introduce a larger perturbation that is easier to detect by a software detector.
In our experiments, we inject an error in a used vector in a given statement and at a specified iteration. In this work, we analyze errors that induce 1, 2, or 4 bit flips. We determine the positions of the bit to flip based on two different probability distributions: uniform and beta 5-1. Beta 5-1 is a distribution where the probability of error occurring increases as we get closer to the higher bit locations, it has been used in other efforts studying silent data corruption [20] , [21] . The uniform distribution, instead, assumes a equally likely probability of errors among the bit locations. We included beta 5-1 distribution in our experiments to explore the dependence of error behavior on the error distribution.
We performed our experiments on a 128-node cluster equipped with two AMD Interlagos [22] 16-core sockets per node, for a total of 32 cores per node and 4096 cores per system. We employed the solver implementations in the Iterative Methods Library (IML++) v1.2a [2] . All solvers are compiled with GCC 4.7 with -O2 optimization, as advised by the solver library IML++. Error injection space includes the number of statements in a method, number of used vectors at a given statement in a method (see Table II ), 28 data sets (24 for CGS, 18 for QMR), type of error distribution and the number of bits flipped (1,2, or 4 bit flips for uniform and beta error distributions).
We performed 100 experiments for each instance in error injection space. Those injections were uniformly random with respect to iteration space and position in the vector. We performed a total of 1,744,800 error injection experiments to study the impact of soft errors on six iterative methods, generating more than 2.5TB of data.
3) Outcome classification: A soft error can result in a variety of outcomes. In this study, the total number of iterations was used to classify the outcomes of the injection experiments.
• MASKED: The execution is masked if the error injection does not change the number of iterations taken by an iterative method to converge to the correct solution.
• FAST: The execution exits the convergence loop (with or without the correct solution) in fewer iterations than the corresponding error-free run.
• SAME: The execution exits the convergence loop after the same number of iterations as error-free execution. This does not necessarily mean it outputs the correct solution.
• ANOMALY: The execution is anomalous, i.e., the number of iterations to converge in the presence of errors differs from the one without errors. However, the impact is not severe, defined as being less than 2× the number of iterations in the error-free run.
• ADVERSE: The execution suffers from severe slowdown, i.e., the execution with an error takes at least twice as long (in terms of number of iterations) to converge as the one without errors. In our categorization, we also use two categories to further classify FAST, SAME, and ANOMALY outcomes. We use the execution with the convergence checkers as the baseline for defining the outcomes. In other words, when a method exits the convergence loop, the solution is checked. If the residual error is less than a given threshold (10 −6 in our experiments), this execution is marked as CONVERGED to the correct solution; otherwise as NOT-CONVERGED. Note that SAME and CONVERGED together is equivalent to MASKED.
IV. SOLVER CHARACTERIZATION
We present the key characteristics of the solvers as inferred from the error-injection experiments. We identify factors that can potentially influence the impact of soft errors to understand the distinguishing features of the behavior of each iterative method under soft error.
We observed that, across all solvers, the outcomes are not significantly influenced by the position in the vector in which the error is injected. Therefore, we do not present those graphs for brevity. Impact of error on number of iterations executed. Figure 2 shows the impact of errors on the number of iterations executed. This is plotted as a ratio of the number of iterations executed in the presence of errors and the number in an error-free run. The figure is a cumulative distribution of the percentage of runs that led to a given ratio of iterations. A number less than 1 indicates a speedup while a number of greater than 1 indicates slowdown. A value close to 1 indicates no change. As the masked outcomes would have drowned out the other features of the graph, we do not include them in this figure.
In general, we observe that a significant fraction of the nonmasked outcomes result in a small change in the number of iterations, often making it faster. In the extreme, errors can result in a reduction in the number of iterations by more than 50%. Note that this could either be due to convergence or erroneously exiting the iterative loop. For all solvers, a small, but significant, fraction (up to 20% for CGS) of the non-masked errors lead to a more than 2.5× increase in the number of iterations. This shows that, in absence of timely detection, errors can have a significant impact on the overall application performance. In the rest of the discussion, we focus on the outcomes rather than the number of iterations. Overall behavior. Figure 3 summarizes all the error-injection experiments for each solver. Figure 3a summarizes the data from the error-injection experiments without taking into account pruning as discussed in Section III. We observe that different solvers result in different frequencies of masked outcomes. A small but significant fractions of runs resulted in adverse outcomes (i.e., > 2× slowdown). Interestingly, BiCGSTAB exhibited a large number of runs in which an error resulted in faster convergence. Also, CGS and QMR exhibit the largest fraction of adverse outcomes. Figure 3b reconstructs and weighs this data as explained in Section III to reconstruct the behavior anticipated in a more exhaustive error-injection experiment. Figure 3b is strikingly different from the one without weights, Figure 3a . The fraction of errors that are masked grows while the fraction of adverse outcomes shrinks. Importantly, the trends between solvers in terms of anomalous runs are not preserved when weights are applied.
In summary, a large fraction of soft errors are masked by all six iterative methods. Therefore, detecting and recovering from all soft errors can be overly pessimistic. In addition, we find that soft errors have a non-trivial probability of leading to faster convergence, lending potential optimization opportunities.
Evaluation of soft error detection techniques needs to account for the the differences due to weights associated with each statement. Even when a detection technique protects only a specific statement of a data structure, error injection with sufficient coverage is required to understand runtime behavior. We have employed an approximate weighting strategy. A more accurate weighting strategy, based on execution time analysis on a specific platform, can be combined with the presented error-injection data to derive a more precise distribution of outcomes. Soft error behavior for different data sets. Figure 4 shows the error-induced behavior of the solvers for each data set. Blank spaces depict cases where an iterative method does not converge for a data set. We observe significant differences in the behavior of solvers between data sets. For example, CG incurs far greater masked outcomes with the ex15 data set than with other data sets considered. Also, QMR shows clear differences in number of adverse outcomes between data sets. All solvers incur significant adverse outcomes with the ex3 data set. A data set that is more vulnerable to soft errors when using one solver is not also vulnerable with a different solver. However, for some data sets, different solvers behave differently. Examples include CGS with the s3rmt3m3 and CG with the bcsstk24 data sets. The relative behavior of the solvers can be markedly different depending on the data sets used. Therefore, choosing workloads representative of the application context of interest is crucial to meaningfully analyze the behavior of iterative methods in the presence of soft errors. Workload-independent analysis should consider as large a collection of data sets as feasible. Impact of error-injection strategy. Figure 5 expands the summary presented in Figure 3b into 1, 2, and 4 bits flipped using uniform or beta distribution. In general, we observe that uniform distribution leads to a smaller fraction of adverse outcomes. In general, corrupting more bits increases the likelihood of an anomalous or adverse outcome. In the case of CGS and BiCGSTAB, the number of masked outcomes is less influenced by the error injection strategy. Interestingly, for CGS, with increase in number of bits corrupted, the fraction of adverse outcomes increases with a proportional decrease in the anomalous outcomes. In this case, the fraction of masked and fast outcomes stays the same. In summary, understanding the soft error behavior of solvers requires an understanding of the types of errors expected to affect the target environment. Figure 6 presents the distribution of outcomes in terms of the vector impacted by an error. We observe that behavior can be grouped into three broad classes. For all solvers considered (except BiCGSTAB), a significant fraction of errors in the solution vector (x) (almost 80%) can lead to incorrect early termination of the execution. This behavior is unique for the x vector for all solvers. Errors in the second group lead to significant fraction of non-masked outcomes. This group is exemplified by vectors p and r in all solvers, with additional vectors in some solvers. These are vectors that are live for a large fraction of the execution duration. In these categories, we observe that a significant fraction of errors in CG and BiCG lead to faster convergence. In the third class are the short-lived vectors, which are less vulnerable to soft errors. A resilience strategy can selectively focus on the solution vector and the vectors in the second category to maximize coverage at a given cost. Figure 7 shows the influence of the statement in which an error in injected. In CG and ICCG, we observe a non-uniform distribution anomalous not converged outcomes. Other than that, we see that solver behavior is less affected by the exact statement being affected by a fault. In particular, CGS and QMR show almost no difference due to the choice of statement. Figure 8 plots the weighted outcomes of the error-injection experiments in terms of the location of the error within the double-precision number: sign-bit, exponent, or mantissa. Because multi-bit errors can affect more than one location, we plot only the outcomes single-bit error injections.
Influence of the vector in which an error is injected.
Influence of the statement in which an error is injected.
Impact of bit positions in which an error is injected.
For all solvers considered, adverse outcomes are mostly restricted to errors affecting the exponent. Across all solvers considered, single-bit errors affecting the mantissa do not lead any observable fraction of outcomes being adverse. A small but noticeable fraction of sign errors results in adverse outcomes. This suggests that protecting the exponent and, possibly, the sign, are more important than protecting the mantissa. Given that the mantissa covers the largest fraction of a doubleprecision number's storage, selective protection for the sign and exponent location might catch the most impactful soft errors. Error injection at different points in the execution. Figure 9 shows the distribution of outcomes depending on the iteration in which errors are injected. The number of iterations executed in a run depends on the data set and the solver. For a given dataset -solver pair, number of iterations vary. Therefore, we normalized the number of iterations across runs. In particular, for each injection run with solver s and data set d, we compute the ratio of the iteration in which the error was injected and the number of iterations executed by solver s on data set d in the absence of errors. This ratio is binned into 20 bins (0-5%, 5-10%, etc.), and the outcomes are presented for each range. We see that errors later in the execution have a greater chance of being masked. Except toward the end of execution, CGS and BiCGSTAB seem least influenced by the iteration in which the error is injected.
A. Posterior Probability Analysis
We analyze the outcome distributions obtained from the error injection experiments to understand the relative susceptibility of different statements and vectors in iterative methods. Specifically, we apply the Bayes' theorem to compute the probability of an error being in a particular statement or vector, given an anomalous or adverse outcome:
where P (S|O) is the posterior probability of a statement being affected by an error (hypothesis) given a specific outcome (evidence or observation); P (O|S) is the likelihood or probability of observing an outcome O given an error affects statement S; P (S) is the prior or probability of an error affecting statement S; and P (O) is the marginal likelihood of a given outcome O. Similarly, we compute P (A|O), where A is the vector impacted by an error.
Figures 10 a-f present P (S|O) information for each iterative method. These graphs plot statement probabilities given there is anomalous (both converged and not converged), or adverse outcomes. We observe that statements performing matrix-vector operations consume a significantly larger fraction of the total time than other operations. Statement numbers corresponding to matrix-vector operations for each iterative method are; CG: {0,3}, ICCG: {0,3}, CGS: {3,4,7,9}, BiCGSTAB: {2,3,7,8} and QMR: {5, 6,9,12,14,15} . In general, we observe that matrixvector operations are the most likely to be affected by an error, given anomalous or adverse outcomes. Intuitively, this implies that any protection scheme should focus on these operations. Interestingly, BiCGSTAB does not exhibit this behavior. In the case of BiCGSTAB, given an anomalous or adverse outcome, matrix-vector operations are no more likely than other operations to be affected by error. Therefore, for BiCGSTAB, protection schemes need to consider many more statements.
Figures 10 g-l give us the posterior probabilities of error happening in a certain vector given the outcome is anomalous and adverse. In general, the specific vector being affected, with an anomalous or adverse outcome, depends on the solver. However, in many cases, vectors p and r are more susceptible that others. Especially if we focus on anomaly not-converged and adverse outcomes, which are the most harmful of all 7 outcome categories being considered, vector r (residual) is the most susceptible in all solvers (with the exception of QMR). Thus, it is the best candidate to be protected against silent data corruption. In the case of QMR, around 80% of the anomalous non-converging outcomes stem from an error occurring at the vector p, whereas adverse outcomes are more or less balanced among the different vectors. In all cases, we observe that vector x (from A · x = b) is the most resilient, and errors affecting x do not yield harmful outcomes as much as errors affecting other vectors.
V. SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive characterization of the behavior of iterative methods in the presence of soft errors. In addition to enabling a concrete understanding of soft error behavior for an important application class, this analysis has the potential to aid the design of soft error detectors and realistic evaluation strategies. Summarizing the data presented in the paper, we observe the following:
• Error-induced solver behavior varies widely. In particular, CGS behaves differently from the other solvers considered.
• The comparative behavior of the solvers varies widely with the selection of data sets. Therefore, a large number of data sets should be chosen for meaningful analysis.
• As shown by CG versus ICCG, a change in the preconditioner can have a noticeable impact on the error behavior.
• Not all vectors are equally impacted by soft errors. In many cases, the solution vector x behaves noticeably differently.
• All solvers except CGS are more resilient to errors in the mantissa than other portions of the floating-point number. Given the diverse characteristics of iterative solvers, soft error detection mechanisms need to be evaluated with multiple solvers. In addition, all potential injection sites must be accounted for in evaluating the usefulness of a soft error detection mechanism, not just a chosen subset of interest. In addition, due to the wide variations in error-induced behavior of solvers with changes in data sets, the effectiveness of any error detection strategy should be evaluated in the context of the application of interest.
VI. DISCUSSION: USING THE CHARACTERIZATION DATA
In this paper, we have focused on detailing our extensive fault-injection experiments and summarizing our observations. af-shell3  af-shell4  af-shell7  af-shell8  bcsstk13  bcsstk14  bcsstk15  bcsstk16  bcsstk24  bcsstk27  bcsstk28  bcsstk38  ex13  ex15  ex3  ex9  Kuu  msc04515  nasa2146  Pres-Poisson  s1rmq4m1  s1rmt3m1  s2rmq4m1  s2rmt3m1  s3rmq4m1  s3rmt3m1  s3rmt3m3 (f) QMR af-shell3  af-shell4  af-shell7  af-shell8  bcsstk13  bcsstk14  bcsstk15  bcsstk16  bcsstk24  bcsstk27  bcsstk28  bcsstk38  ex13  ex15  ex3  ex9  Kuu  msc04515  nasa2146  Pres-Poisson  s1rmq4m1  s1rmt3m1  s2rmq4m1  s2rmt3m1  s3rmq4m1  s3rmt3m1  s3rmt3m3 Developing strategies to exploit this data to build resilience solutions is not this paper's focus. In this section, we summarize some ways in which the presented data might be used. Soft-error detector design: An ideal soft-error detection strategy will detect and report all types of errors (high coverage), the moment the error impacts the application (low detection latency), with no performance penalty (low performance overhead). But for the most-trivial applications, such detectors do not exist. The best detector depends on the use case. This has motivated the design of multiple types of detectors for different classes of programs. Considering iterative solvers, the data in this paper was used to comparatively evaluate four detection strategies: adaptive impact-driven detection (AID) [23] , Orthonormality based detection [24] , checksumbased detection [25] , and moving average detector [26] . In addition, the characterization data was used to train machinelearning based detector that combined the features of these individual detectors [27] .
Comparative solver evaluation: The numerical characteristics of solvers have been extensively studied. In particular, choosing the right solver and preconditioner for a given problem can have a dramatic impact on the time to solution. However, the relative resilience behavior of solvers is not well understood or characterized. The overall resilience of a solver depends on the time it takes to solve a system of equations and its vulnerability to errors. While a fast invulnerable solver is desired, the relative performance and vulnerability of different solvers needs to be quantified to evaluate their overall performance in the presence of errors.
Selective resilience strategies: With a detailed understanding of the impact of errors on a solver's runtime behavior, one can design tailored resilience solutions. For example, we observe that sign and exponent are most responsible for the adverse outcomes ( Figure 9 ). Strategies to detect the most egregious changes in these parts of a floating point number might incur less overhead than techniques that detect errors affecting the mantissa. As another use case, we observe that vectors p and r are responsible for the most adverse outcomes in the CG solver ( Figure 6 ). Studying the CG algorithm (Figure 1 ), we observe that both vectors are updated using vector operations, which are much cheaper than matrix-vector multiplication. Going further, no reads or writes to r involve matrix-vector multiplication. Therefore, r can be cheaply protected while almost halving the number of adverse outcomes for CG.
Design-space exploration for energy efficiency: In trying to improve energy efficiency, various forms of less-than-exact execution have been considered. One such option is the use of unreliable memory (e.g., [28] ). Data structures which, when affected by an error, have a lower impact on the application might be beneficially placed on such less reliable memory. In Figure 6 , we clearly see that some vectors have negligible impact on application correctness with respect to soft errors (e.g., z and q for CG/ICCG, qhat and vhat for CGS, and qtilde and ztilde for BiCG). In addition to performing such static mapping of vectors to memory regions, the temporal information in the characterization data can be used to query for change in vulnerability as the execution progress. This can be used to device dynamic remapping strategies.
In general, we believe the data is a useful resource to quickly test hypothesis relating to the runtime behavior of iterative solvers, develop new solutions that exploit the observed behavior, and comparatively evaluate different strategies.
VII. RELATED WORK
Many resilience studies based on fault injection campaigns use random fault injection [7] , [8] , [12] , [29] , [30] . Random fault injection enables statistical coverage of a large space with a relatively smaller number of experiments, and is employed when the user cannot or does not make assumptions about architecture or application vulnerability. We employ random fault injection on a subset of the application state-the vectorsto focus our efforts on the key data structures that are modified in iterative methods.
Cho et al. [7] observed that lower-level fault injection approaches are more accurate than higher-level injection studies. Hsueh et al. [31] and Ziade et al. [32] survey common fault injection tools, concluding that Register Transfer Level (RTL) fault injection [8] (examples include VERIFY [33] and MEFISTO-C [34] ) as well as injecting faults into actual hardware using a particle accelerator are most accurate. However, these methods are too low-level to make detailed characterization of realistic applications and data sets.
Architecture-level fault injection [9] , [10] , [35] addresses some of these challenges but can still be expensive to perform injection campaigns such as the one presented in this paper. Moreover, it is very difficult to develop specialized architecturelevel fault injectors for a particular class of algorithms such as iterative solvers. FERRARI (Fault And Error automatic real time injection) [36] uses traps to insert faults on CPU components (branches, registers, instructions), memory, or bus packets. They can be time or place triggered. FTAPE (Fault Tolerance and Performance Evaluator) [37] can inject bit flips on CPU modules, memory location, and disk subsystems using fault injection drivers attached to the OS and are inserted based on activity levels. FIAT (Fault Injection based automated testing) [38] is an environment that enables one to develop several fault injection scenarios by allowing the experimenters to decide where, when, and how faults are injected. It can be used to inject faults in messages, as they being corrupted, lost, or delayed; and on tasks, which can be delayed or aborted, as well as on timers. DOCTOR [39] allows injections into the CPU, memory, and network messages. It is an important tool when simulating memory faults because of the subtle and non-deterministic way in which memory faults might manifest. It uses three triggering mechanisms: time outs for memory faults, traps for transient faults, and compilation based injection when dealing with permanent CPU faults.
Software-based error injection can be performed using binary instrumentation [12] , compile-time transformations [11] , [13] , [40] , [41] , or operating system level injection [36] . KULFI [13] and VULFI [42] are LLVM-based fault injection tools that use the LLVM infrastructure to simulate transient faults in CPU state elements. Compared to other approaches, they provide finegrained error injection control and features to control where (on the control flow of the program) and how (register, load/store, branches, etc.) to insert the fault. PDSFIS [43] uses the PIN Intel framework to inject faults without changing the source code or recompiling. It can target any software component visible to the PIN tools (including dynamic libraries) and can be used to do pattern-based fault injection into specific software components. There are also studies using emulation and virtualization to provide an injection set-up that requires minimal modification to the system or application [44] , [45] .
Each technique stresses distinct aspects of an application's footprint (e.g., architectural registers vs intermediate representation, specific compiler passes, etc.). We use application-level injection to understand application vulnerability in terms of program elements, analogous to program or data vulnerability factors [46] , [47] (as compared to the architecture vulnerability factor [48] ).
An important aspect of such studies is the coverage of the error injection experiments. Xu and Li [49] proposed statistical fault injection coverage and pruning of the testing space to increase the performance and coverage as compared to "blind" sampling. We prune the error injection space by studying the implementations of the iterative methods. Our approach complements the one presented by Xu and Li and can be used in conjunction when an iterative method is used in the context of a larger application.
Elliott et al. [50] characterize the GMRES iterative solver in terms of the impact of single-bit soft errors using numerical analysis of the algorithm. Such analysis complements our approach as it considers multiple error-injection scenarios and data-set-specific characteristics. Previous works on soft error detection for iterative methods have employed errorinjection to evaluate their detection strategies [4] , [20] , [23] - [26] , [51] . We present a more comprehensive error-injection strategy and analysis than in these works. The data produced by our experiments can be leveraged to systematically compare detectors.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a comprehensive characterization of the iterative method behavior under soft errors. We considered 6 solvers, 28 datasets, and multiple fault injection scenarios. We believe this data is a useful resource that can aid in testing runtime behavior of iterative solvers, comparative solver evaluation, error detection studies, and design space exploration.
We employed simplified weights, especially for preconditioners, to the statement costs. These weights can be tuned for specific architecture and software stack through trial executions to obtain more accurate statement execution costs.
The analysis presents averages (arithmetic mean) of the error injection experiments from different data sets by taking into account the statement execution costs. Depending on the target workload, the analysis across the data sets can be performed in different ways. To enable such analysis, we have publicly released the data from the error injection experiments.
APPENDIX
In this appendix, we describe the fault-injection and characterization data made available at https://github.com/pnnl/IMIC. We collected about 2.5TB of data from the fault-injection experiments. This data included the injection characteristics (location, time, number of bits, etc.), convergence result (Masked, Anomaly, etc.), as well as other monitored values such as the norm of the residual vector over the course of the execution. To ease public access, we extracted the injection and convergence information from all the fault injection experiments and made it available in a table-like format. To enable reproducibility of our experiments, we also provide links to the libraries used and modifications applied to generate the data.
